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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
MARC CHESNUT, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant appeals his conviction for theft under 
Sections 76-6-404 and 76-6-412, U.C.A. (1953), as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The jury in the lower court found the defendant guilty 
of exercizing unauthorized control over an operable motor 
vehicle, and judgment was subsequently entered against him as a 
third degree felony. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment below. 
-1-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
After midnight on the 27th of June 1979, the defendant, 
Marc Chesnut, was stopped while walking his friend's motorcycle 
in the street in front of the friend's house. The defendant 
told the officer who stopped him that the motorcycle was his 
neighbor's and that he planned on riding it in a nearby vacant 
field (T-10) . The officer awakened the neighbor who stated 
the defendant did not have permission to ride his motorcycle 
(T-29). An additional officer, Officer Evans, was called who 
effected the arrest of the defendant for auto theft (T-22)·. 
At trial a principal issue was whether the defendant 
had the intention to permanently deprive the owner of his motor-
cycle, as required under Section 76-6-404, U.C.A. (1953), as 
amended. The arresting officer, Officer Evans, testified that 
the defendant told him on the way to police headquarters that 
he had taken the motorcycle because the defendant owed him 
money (T-23) . The defendant took the stand and denied that 
statement (T-61, 62}. He testified that he tried to get per-
mission that night by waking the owner (T-53,55) and that since 
they were friends he felt it would be~lright if he took the 
bike for awhile (T-59). Additionally, he testified that his 
intention was to return the motorcycle after an "hour or so," 
immediately following ~1is ride ('l'-54, 55, 59}. 
After the presentation of the State's case-in-chief, 
the defendant moved to dismiss the case due to the State's 
failure to present evidence that the defendant's intention was 
to permanently deprive the owner of his vehicle (T-47) . At the 
-2-
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close of all the evidence, the defense moved for a directed 
verdict on the same grounds (T-71) . Both these motions were 
denied. 
At sentencing defense counsel had submitted motions 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for new trial. 
These motions, relating to the issues raised in this appeal, 
were denied. 
Further, the trial court refused to allow a jury 
instruction as to the lesser included offense of "joyriding," 
Section 41-1-109, U.C.A. (1953}, as amended (T-70). The 
instruction was founded upon the defendant's testimony at trial 
and the defense's theory of the case. 
The trial court also denied the defense permission to 
cross-examine the owner of the motorcycle, Mr. Covington, with 
regard to the motives behind his testimony (T-38) . Prosecution 
objections were sustained by the court despite the fact that 
the arresting officer in this case, Officer Evans, was also the 
officer investigating the witness in a separate matter (T-38). 
The trial concluded on September 19, 1979, with the 
jury returning a verdict of guilty to the charge of theft of an 
operable motor vehicle, Section 76-6-404 and Section 76-6-412, 
U.C.A. (1953), as amended. On February 22, 1980 judgment was 
entered thereon by the court. TDis appeal was then filed on 
March 4, 1980. 
-3-
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that: 
ARGUMENT 
I. BY FAILING TO PRESENT "INDEPENDENT, CLEAR AND 
CONVINCING" EVIDENCE, SHOWING DEFENDANT'S 
INTENT TO PERMANENTLY DEPRIVE, THE STATE DID 
NOT ESTABLISH THE CORPUS DELICTI FOR AUTO 
THEFT. 
Section 76-6-404, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, states 
A person conunits theft if he obtains or 
exercises unauthorized control over the 
property of another with a purpose to 
deprive him thereof. {Emphasis added.] 
Section 76-6-401(3), U.C.A. (1953}, as amended,_ 
defines the meaning of "purpose to deprive" that applies to 
Section 76-6-404: 
"Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious 
object: 
(a} To withhold property permanently or for so 
extended a period or to use under such circumstances 
that a substantial portion of its economic value, 
or of the use and benefit thereof, would be 
lost. {Emphasis added.] 
Thus, a necessary element of the crime defined by 
Section 76-6-404 is that the person possess an intention to 
permanently deprive the owner of his property. 
In the case of State v. Knoefler, 563 P.2d 175 (Utah 
19771, the issue was whether or not the corpus del cti had been 
made out so as to sustain a conviction for driving and inflicting 
injury while under the influence of intoxicants. This court held 
that the State must "present evidence that the injury specified 
in the crime occurred'' for the court to sustain the conviction. 
Id. at 176. Applied to the facts at hand, Knoefler requires that 
the State present evidence specifically demonstrating that the 
defendant possessed the intention to nt:lrm;:in.on+-1 .. , ,.:i~,..._ .... ..: ··- ..L.l-: 
-4-
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owner of the motor vehicle in order to establish the corpus 
delicti. 
State v. Ferry, 275 P.2d 173 (Utah 1954), and State v. 
Weldon 314 P.2d 353 (Utah 1957) set standards for the quality 
of evidence required to demonstrate the intention for corpus 
delicti purposes. 
In Ferry the court reversed a conviction of carnal 
knowledge for lack of "independent, clear and convincing evi-
dence of the corpus delicti" other than a confession of the 
accused. Id.at 173 State v. Weldon, supra, relied upon Ferry 
and reinforced the requirement that there be a high quality of 
evidence, "clear and convincing," and that it be "independent" 
of the accused's confession. 
Weldon involved a conviction for conspiring to commit 
a robbery. It is significant here for demonstrating that a 
"plausible argun1ent" that evidence supporting a specific element 
of the crime charged does not establish the corpus deli.cti. 
It is appreciated that a plausible argument 
can be made that the facts here shown, 
independent of the confession, constitute 
sufficient independent evidence of the corpus 
delicti ... Id. at 357 IEmphasis added]. 
The court required a high standard as to the quality of 
evidence. Despite there being "A plausible argument" that the 
evidence satisfied the corpus delicti, despite a possible 
"sufficiency'' under some other standard of proof, the evidence 
presented did not meet the "independent, clear and convincing" 
-5-
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standard in force in Utah. Such is the case here with regard 
to the defendant's alleged intention to permanently deprive 
the owner of his motorcycle. 
Excluding the alleged confession of defendant (T-23), 
the evidence upon which the state relies to meet the "independent,· 
clear and convincing'' standard is the following: the defendant 
was walking a motorcycle away from his friend's house after mid-
night, along the street, and in the direction of his own house 
which was on the same block. This evidence differs markedly from 
the evidence needed in other similar cases to demonstrate that 
there was an intention to permanently deprive. 
In Webber v. State 376 P.2d 348 (Ok.Cr.Ap. 1962) in-
tention to permanently deprive sufficient to meet the corpus 
delicti standards was inferred after the car had been driven to 
another state, wrecked, abandoned, and not discovered until one 
week later. See also State v. Daniel, 584 P.2d 880 (Utah 1978). 
Nothing of that nature has occurred here. On the facts, 
' defendant was within a few yards of the owners house ~nd walking 
the motorcycle toward his own home on the same block (T-10). 
This does not constitute "independent, clear and convincing" 
evidence that the defendant had an intention to permanently 
deprive. At best it could be said only that there was clear 
and convincing evidence that the appellant exercised unauthorized 
control over the property. Accordingly, the State's evidence 
does not meet the standard necessary to establish the corpus 
-6-
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delicti. The rul~ng on the Motion to Dismiss should be 
reversed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
BY REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE 
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF "JOYRIDING," 
SECTION 41-1-109 (1953), AS A.MENDED. 
At the commencement of the trial the defense re-
quested that the court give a jury instruction that pertains 
to the offense of "joyriding." This instruction was later 
refused. The defense took exception and cited the refusal as 
error (T-70). 
Recent Utah Supreme Court cases have made it clear that 
"joyriding" is a lesser included offense in the crime of auto 
theft. In State v. Cornish 508 P.2d 360 (Utah 1977), the 
defendant was charged with auto theft under Section 76-6-404, 
U.C.A. (1953}_, as amended, yet convicted of joyriding under 
Section 41-1-109, U.C.A. (1953), as amended. This court upheld 
the conviction as prope:r, stating that "joyriding" was a lesser 
included offense. The reason stated for this holding was that 
all essential elements of the theft statute and the "joyriding" 
statute were similar with the exception of the requirement as to 
intent. "The only fact the state is not required to establish 
for 'joyriding,' which is required for theft, is the intent to 
permanently deprive." Id. at 361. 
Similarly in State v. Lloyd 568 P.2d 357, 358 (Utah 
1977) : 
-7-
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The contention stated by defendant that the 
U1lawful taking of a vehicle under Section 
41-1-109, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, is not 
a lesser and included offense of theft of 
an operable motor vehicle under Section 
76-6-404, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, supra, 
is rejected for reasons stated today in 
State v. Cornish, 568 P.2d 360. 
In the Cornish case the court went on to say that 
the burden of showing the intention to permanently deprive 
required by the theft statute, as compared to the intention to 
temporarily deprive, required by the joyriding statute, was 
upon the state. Further, the Court stated that: 
"If there is an issue as to whether the prose-
cution has sustained the burden, or if the 
defendant presents evidence under his theory 
which negates the factors in Section 76-6-401 
(3) Idefining intention to permanently de-
prive] , the matter of circumstances of the 
intent should be presented to the trier of 
fact." 508 P.2d at 362 
It is this issue upon which the defense here relie~. Evidence 
was presented by the defense which negates a finding of the 
necessary intent to permanently deprive. There was an issue as 
to whether or not the defendant's intent was to permanently or 
temporarily deprive. 
Defendant testified under oath that his intention was 
I 
solely to have possession of the vehicle for an hour or so (T-54). 1 
Further, he presented evidence for taking the motorcycle without 
asking permission. (He couldn't wake the owner), (T-53, 55), 
for pushing the motorcycle instead of riding it (the vehicle was 
out of gas) (T-55), and for wishing to ride the motorcycle at 
that hour (others had done it at that time of night, the neighbors 
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who could most likely hear the noise were out of town, the 
field and school yard were lighted) . 
All of the above factors must at least be construed as 
"evidence presented" or creating "an issue" as to whether or not 
the defendant's intention was to deprive the owner permanently 
or temporarily. These matters of evidence create the situation 
as described in Cornish. Thus the question of permanent or 
temporary intent to deprive, auto theft versus joyriding, needed 
to be submitted to the jury, the trier of fact. 
The case of State v. Gillion, 463 P.2d 811 (Utah 
1970) , supports the position that the Court took in Cornish and 
deals with the Court's obligations to instruct the jury that 
joyriding is a lesser and included offense to the crime of auto 
theft. 
In Gillion, the Court held that the presentation of 
any reasonable evidence supporting a lesser included offense 
requires that a jury instruction for the lesser included offense 
be given. Failure to do so results in reversible error. 
One of the foundational principles in regard to 
the submission of issues to juries is that where 
the parties so request they are entitled to have 
instruction given upon their theory of the case; 
and this includes lesser offenses if any reason-
able view of the evidence would support such a 
verdict. Id. at 812. !Emphasis added.] 
The Court stressed the fact that the jury should not 
be presented with an either/or proposition. Additionally, the 
question which the court had on appeal was not whether any 
-9-
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reasonable evidence justified the verdict of the jury, but 
rather whether there was "any reasonable view of the evidence" 
which would support a theory based upon a lesser and included 
offense. If there was such a view of the evidence, the Court 
was required to instruct the jury as to that lesser and in-
eluded offense. 
As stated above, there exists ample evidence in the 
case at hand to draw a "reasonable view" that joyriding might 
have existed. The defendant testified, that his intent was only 
to ride for an "hour or so." The circumstantial evidence ·also 
shows this entirely plausible. A field for riding was nearby, 
defendant had heard others riding at night before, and the only 
person he was seriously concerned about waking was his mother 
(T-61). 
To conclude, Cornish requires a matter to be submitted 
to a jury when there is "an issue." Gillion requires submission 
of lesser included offenses if there is "any reasonable view of 
the evidence" to support it. Defendant's proposed instruction 
for joyriding qualified on both grounds. The Court's refusal to 
submit it to the jury constituted reversible error. 
III. REFUSAL TO PERMIT QUESTIONS AS TO THE STATE'S 
WITNESS, MR. COVINGTON'S, MOTIVE FOR 
TESTIFYING WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
During cross examination of the State's witness, 
Kenny Covington, the Court sustained objections to a line of 
questioning which would have demonstrated the witness' motive for 
-10-
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testifying as he had (T-36, 40). The defense sought to show a 
relationship existed between the arresting officer in the 
matter at hand, Officer Evans, and Mr. Covington. Officer Evans 
was at that time the investigating officer in a crime for which 
. ' he had investigated Mr. Covingtons involvement. The Court 
relied upon Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence to sustain the 
objection (T-37). 
Rule 45 allows a trial judge to exclude otherwise ad-
missible evidence if admission would result in an undue con-
sumption of time, create confusion or prejudice in the minds of 
the jury or unfairly surprise another party. 
"Except as in these rules otherwise provided, the 
Judge may in his discretion exclude evidence if 
he finds that its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the risk that its ad-
mission will (a) necessitate undue consumption 
of time, of (b) create substantial danger of 
undue prejudice or of confusing the issues or 
misleading the jury, or (c) unfairly and harm-
fully surprise a party who has not had reason-
able opportunity to anticipate that such evi-
dence would be offered." 
This discretionary right of the trial judge, however, must be 
balanced against the specific right to cross-examine a witness 
as to his motive for testifying. This right has both statutory 
and constitutional roots. 
Section 78-24-1, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, provides 
in part that "in every case the credibility of the witness may be 
drawn in question ... by his motives; and the jury are the 
exclusive judges of his credibility." Cross-examination as to 
motives is vital if the jury is to play its proper role. 
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In the case of Davis v. Alaska 415 U.S. 308, 316 
(1974) the United States Supreme Court emphasized the 
constitutional right to cross-examine as to motive: 
Cross examination is the principal means by which 
the believability of a witness and the truth of 
the testimony is tested. . . We have recognized 
that the exposure of a witness' motivation in 
testifying is a proper and important function of 
the constitutionally protected right of cross-
examination. 
This statement was relied upon in the Utah case of 
State v. Maestas, 564 P.2d 1386 (Utah 1977), where the Court re-
emphasized the "long recognized. . . particular significatice of 
cross-examination and the fact that the interest of a witness is 
a matter which the jury must weigh against his credibility." 
Id. at 1388. This restated the rule from State v. Cerrar, 
207 P.597 (Utah 1922) where the Court held: 
The interest of a witness in any particular case 
in which he becomes a witness may always be shown, 
and the effect, if any, upon the weight of the 
testimony is always a question for the jury. Id. 
at 602. 
Hence, there are strong and deep rooted statutory and constitu-
tional rights accorded to the right to cross-examine in order to 
determine a witness' motive for testifying. 
State v. Maestas, supra, is of particular significan~ 
here as it sets out the standards to determine when an error in 
limiting cross-examination results in prejudicial error. In 
Maestas· the defendant was convicted of assault by a prisoner and 
appealed on grounds that limiting cross-examination as to the 
victim~ motive for testifying as he did was prejudicial error. 
-12-
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The defense sought to demonstrate that the victim testified 
as he did so that he would be removed from maximum security 
at the prison. Counsel was prohibited from pursuing a line of 
questioning that would show an agreement between the testifying 
police officer to the effect that the victim would be removed 
from maximum security depending upon how he testified. The 
Court held that there was error, but that it was not prejudi-
cial error. The reason that the error was not prejudicial was 
because the Court held the issue of an agreement between the 
police officer and the victim made it to the jury despite ·the 
limitations on the cross examination. 
While neither Hart fthe victim] nor other witnesses 
were actually asked whether any promise was given, 
the implication that one may have been was clearly 
before the jury. 
Courts have found no prejudice where information 
that may be brought out by further questioning was 
already before the jury either from the testimony 
of others or by implication from the witness' own 
testimony. Id. at 1389. 
Despite the limitations on cross examination, and the fact that 
they were error, the issue had sufficiently made its way to the 
jury in the Maestas case. 
Here, however, though the issue is identical, the 
facts are not. Unlike Maestas, here the jury did not receive 
evidence to judge whether the witness' testimony (Mr. Covington's) 
was influenced by the ability of the officer to be lenient or 
harsh with the charge for which he had been investigated. The 
only indications that the jury had as to this relationship were 
during the restricted cross examination of Mr. Covington 
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(T-36, 40) and another series of questions directly follow-
ing (T-40, 42}. 
The pertinent part of the latter series of questions 
was as follows: 
Question: !Defense] Has anyone told you that 
you had to testify you did not 
give him (defendant} permission 
to ride the bike? 
Answer: [Mr. Covington] What do you mean 
I had to testify? 
Question: [Defense] So we are sure you under-
stand the question, Kenny, I will 
ask this again in different words. 
Since the time that you came out of 
your house on the 27th of June at 
2:45 in the morning, have you had 
conversations with anyone concerning 
your testimony? 
Answer: No, not really. I just -- No. 
Question: You said before that you had talked 
with Officer Evans earlier. Was it 
last Sunday you said? 
Answer: He told me when I had to be here and 
that I had to testify, you know. 
Question: {The Court] What Mr. Schumacher is 
asking you, did anybody tell you how 
you had to testify? 
Answer: No, they just told me if I didn't tell 
the truth I would be the one that 
went to jail (T-40, 42). 
This series of questions did bring before the jury Mr. Covington's 
testimony that no one told him that he did not give the defendant 
permission to ride his motorcycle. What it did not bring before 
the jury was the very real ability of Officer Evans to increase 
-14-
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Mr. Covington's chances of actually going to jail for another 
crime, depending upon Mr. Covington's testimony. This relation-
ship, that of both Officer Evans and Mr. Covington to another 
pending criminal charge, did not come before the jury. The 
reason for this was the denial of the defense's questions on 
cross-examination as shown below: 
Question: Okay. You have talked within the last 
few days with Officer Kenny Evans about 
the trial? 
Answer: IMr. Covington] Yes. 
Question: When was that? 
Answer: Sunday. 
Question: Where did you talk with him? 
Answer: In the cops car. 
Question: Did you go anywhere with him? 
Answer: Yes. 
Question: Where did you go? 
Answer: County Jail. 
Question: Was that in connection with an in-
vestigation he was doing? 
Mr. Anderson IProsecution] Your Honor, 
I object. [Objection 
sustained] (T-3 6, 3 7) 
Question: Did Officer Evans question you concerning 
what your testimony would be today? 
Answer: He just told me if I lied I would go to 
jail. 
Question: He had already taken you to the jail 
that night? 
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Mr. Anderson: Your Honor, I object 
to that question. 
The Witness: This was over a different 
thing. 
The Court: Just a moment$ I sustain 
that objection. I will 
instruct the jury not to 
pay any attention to the 
question or the answer. 
Question: (By Mr. Schumacher) Isn't it true he had 
arrested you for another offense? 
Mr. Anderson: Your Honor, I object. 
The Court: I sustain that objection. 
Although these questions do bring out that there 
was a criminal charge against Mr. Covington and that Officer 
Evans was involved in the case, it does not establish the fact 
that the charge was pending and that Officer Evans as in-
vestigating officer had a very real ability to influence Mr. 
Covington's testimony. 
Failure to allow this relationship to come before 
the jury constitutes error under an infringement of the right to 
cross-examine under Davis and Section 78-24-1, U.C.A. (1953), as 
amended, as cited above. Because the error actually prevented 
significant evidence from coming before the jury, Maestas shows 
that the error was prejudicial. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant has presented three arguments as to why 
the Court should reverse the judgment of the Court below: (1) 
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The State did not provide "independent, clear and convincing" 
evidence of the defendant's alleged intention to permanently 
deprive necessary to establish the corpus delicti of auto theft 
under Section 76-6-404 U.C.A. (1953), as amended. (2) The trial 
Court committed reversible error by refusing to instruct the 
jury on the defendant's proposed instruction for the lesser and 
included offense of "joyriding," Section 41-1-109 U.C.A. 
(1953), as amended. (3) The trial Court further committed pre-
judicial error by denying the defense permission to cross-
examine the State's witness, Mr. Covington, as to his motives for 
testifying as he did. 
For the reasons above, the appellant prays that the 
judgment of the lower Court be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
Utah County 
107 East 100 
Provo, Utah 
Assoc. 
Attorney for Defendant-
Appellant 
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